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Introduction 
On January 23rd 1973, Richard Nixon announced: ‘we today have concluded an 
agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.’1 
This speech marked an end to American involvement in the Vietnam War and a final 
agreement of peace between the North and South regions of Vietnam. For America this 
announcement followed a tumultuous few decades. The ongoing war meant that the Nixon 
administration had to deal with immense defence spending, a vast number of casualties, 
reduced U.S. domestic support and constant attempts to get Hanoi and Saigon to negotiate in 
an attempt to end the war. The aim of this dissertation is to assess the significance of Nixon’s 
‘peace with honor’ by evaluating the intentions of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy 
with regard to ending the Vietnam War. In addition, this dissertation will evaluate how far 
Nixon’s foreign policies achieved their aims. There were no easily available opportunities for 
Nixon to adopt in his foreign policy to end the war in Vietnam; as stated by Henry Kissinger 
in his memoirs: ‘by the time Nixon took office, the available choices in Vietnam were among 
unilateral withdrawal, escalation and Vietnamization. They all had unpalatable aspects.’2 
Therefore, as Kissinger suggested, no foreign policy initiatives were likely to gain unanimous 
support in an already well drawn-out war in Vietnam. The Nixon administration sought a 
solution that would end their involvement as soon as possible without destroying their efforts 
of the past few decades; it was hoped that continued effort for a peace agreement would help 
to diffuse future disputes in the region. 
In the years following Nixon’s Presidential inauguration both North and South grew 
more intransigent with negotiations. Therefore, it became one of Nixon’s priorities to end 
                                                            
1 Richard Nixon, ‘Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam’, (January 23, 1973), Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project,  <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3808> 
2 Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the 
Vietnam War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), p. 94 
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intransigence and speed up negotiations to get an agreement concluded. Nixon’s ‘peace with 
honor’ is often judged alongside his foreign policies individually. Consequently, historians 
have argued that Nixon had produced neither peace nor honour from the war. For example, to 
assess the 1972 Linebacker II operation individually, it would seem that Nixon escalated the 
war and bombed a populous city, which seemed at odds with his desire for ‘peace with 
honor.’ However, this view fails to appreciate the intention of the bombing campaign. 
Therefore, this dissertation will address the intentions of Nixon’s foreign policy and argue 
that the combination of Nixon’s policies provided his best opportunity to achieve ‘peace with 
honor’ in Vietnam and for the U.S. 
Following the peace agreement of the Vietnam War, historiographical debate about 
the Nixon administration’s policies adapted to ongoing circumstances and increased 
availability of documents. Initially, historians who experienced the war first hand remained 
overtly critical. However, over time inherent limitations of the Nixon administration were 
soon recognised.  Orthodox historiography originated in the mid-1970’s and tended to be 
more critical of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy albeit varied criticisms.3 David 
Halberstam argued that Nixon was not seeking peace but was instead trying to attain a victory 
in Vietnam. Halberstam claimed ‘Nixon himself spoke of the fact that America had never lost 
a war, precisely the kind of speech a President needed to avoid if he wanted to disengage.’4 
Jeffrey Kimball argued that Nixon’s Vietnam policy was aimed at achieving a ‘decent 
interval’5 before the war ended as to save embarrassment and potentially preserve 
international credibility. In a similar way to Kimball, Jussi Hanhimaki argued that there was 
no real ‘peace with honor’ and instead the final result was ‘a temporary truce that allowed the 
United States to withdraw its remaining troops from South Vietnam and retrieve its prisoners 
                                                            
3 John Dumbrell, Rethinking the Vietnam War, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 16 
4 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 664-5 
5 Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), p. 364 
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of war from Hanoi.’6 There was also a common theme which surrounded the orthodox 
debate, this theme identified that Nixon’s ‘peace with honor’ was a failure and consequently 
the Nixon administration sought a ‘decent interval: an American withdrawal in return for a 
period of North Vietnamese restraint.’7  
In the 1980’s there was increased revisionist debate regarding Nixon’s foreign policy 
goals.8 Revisionist historians have tried to vindicate orthodox interpretations and offer a more 
optimistic view of the Nixon administration’s involvement with Vietnam. Guenter Lewy 
argued that ‘Nixon’s Linebacker bombing helped bring about a cease-fire’9 and thus a final 
agreement with both Vietnamese regions. Michael Lind argued that the Vietnam War was 
necessary and furthermore the escalation of the war in 1972 ‘was necessary in order to defend 
the credibility of the United States.’10 Post-revisionists have argued that the United States was 
fighting an unwinnable war and ‘peace with honor’ was unlikely.11 Gabriel Kolko gave a 
more balanced view; he recognised the limited military options of both North and South 
Vietnam and argued: ‘the growing limitations on the United States after 1969 made 
diplomacy increasingly the only area in which the administration could seek to attain its 
objectives without running into material and political constraints.’12 However, despite this 
claim there is evidence to support the argument that military aspects were particularly 
instrumental in aiding diplomatic negotiations. For example, the North Vietnamese Spring 
                                                            
6 Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p.  229 
7 Hanhimaki,  Flawed Architect, p. 230 
8 Dumbrell, Vietnam, p. 17 
9 Dumbrell, Vietnam, p. 18 
10 Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War, (New York: Touchstone, 1999), p. 39 
11 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience, (London: 
Phoenix Press, 2001), p. 355 
12 Kolko, Anatomy of War, p. 355 
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Offensive from 1972 arguably failed due to U.S. aid and military campaigns such as 
Linebacker I.13 
In contrast, this dissertation will aim to evaluate whether Nixon’s foreign policy made 
a significant contribution to bringing about a conclusion to negotiations and ending American 
military involvement. In essence, did the Nixon administration achieve ‘peace with honor’ 
within their intended foreign policy goals during the period of the Vietnam War? To fully 
assess whether the Nixon administration succeeded in achieving their aims, this dissertation 
will evaluate the influence of ‘peace with honor’ within spurring on the negotiation process 
and more importantly within military campaigns such as Operation Linebacker II. In addition, 
it will be argued that Nixon’s ‘peace with honor’ phrase was relevant to problems in the 
wider Cold War world with regard to the Soviet Union talks and the opening to China. This 
assessment will only review the foreign policy of the Nixon administration up to the Paris 
Peace Accords of 1973. Following the peace agreement it was arguably more difficult for 
Nixon to assist the South Vietnamese against violations from North Vietnam with major 
budget cuts on defence, initiated by the new Congress of 1973 and the consecutive Veto of 
the War Powers Resolution, October 24th 1973.  
The first chapter of this dissertation will assess the introduction of Nixon’s linkage 
into American foreign policy. Linkage was developed from Nixon and Kissinger’s plan for a 
realistic approach to policy and diplomacy, or what was also known as realpolitik. Nixon’s 
plan for ‘realistic’ politics implied a globalisation of policy meaning that problems within the 
world were related and should be dealt with more globally. Therefore, linkage politics was 
intended to help improve international relations and the Nixon administration hoped this 
might have a positive impact on Vietnam peace negotiations.  The main themes of this 
                                                            
13 Orrin Schwab, A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations During the Vietnam War, (Westport: Praeger, 
2006), p. 80 
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chapter include: the multiple intentions of linkage, the impact that Operation Linebacker II 
had on diplomatic relations and the achievements of linkage with regard to the Soviet Union 
and China. The foreign policy goals of the Nixon administration can be sourced from a 
variety of documents such as the four annual reports to Congress by President Nixon between 
1970 and 1973 which indicate Nixon’s ‘structure of peace’. To consider the impact of linkage 
on the Vietnam War peace negotiations this chapter will evaluate Nixon’s foreign policy 
reports; various memoranda and transcripts from 1969 to 1973 within the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, U.S. Department of State; as well as the memoirs from both President 
Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. These sources will give insight into 
how much of an impact linkage had according to the Nixon administration. The intention of 
this chapter is to argue that the ultimate objective of linkage politics was to help encourage 
peaceful international relations and détente with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 
prioritisation of diplomacy with ideologically opposed countries implied a more honourable 
international policy. 
The second chapter will assess the Vietnamization policy, in an attempt to elicit its 
honourable purpose. Some war critics believed the best option for the Nixon administration 
was immediate unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam; however Nixon and Kissinger opposed 
this option because it represented a blatant betrayal... of our ally’14 and would give them ‘no 
chance to survive on [their] own.’15 Vietnamization was essentially intended to toughen the 
South Vietnamese so that the U.S. could reduce their involvement; it was hoped that this 
would be useful in spurring on negotiations with the North. The problem was that U.S. 
withdrawal was imminent and Vietnamization was the only way to preserve leverage over the 
North Vietnamese with regard to negotiations. The themes of this chapter will include: the 
                                                            
14 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 286 
15 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 286 
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need for the U.S. to strengthen the South Vietnamese self-reliance and self-determination, the 
impact that Vietnamization had on U.S. domestic support and finally the achievements of the 
policy. The origins and intentions of Vietnamization will be evaluated through National 
Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) 1 and 23 and the Nixon Doctrine speech from July 25th, 
1969. Nixon’s four foreign policy reports to Congress from 1970 to 1973 will also provide a 
majority of the evidence for this chapter. This chapter intends to argue that Vietnamization 
represented the honourable component of Nixon’s ‘peace with honor’ as it attempted to 
strengthen the South Vietnamese; this attempt intended to make the South more reliant on 
their own self-defence and as a result they would not have to depend on other countries for 
support.  
The final chapter of this dissertation will assess the impact of Operation Linebacker II 
in speeding up negotiations with North and South Vietnam and initiating a peace agreement. 
Following the failure of the 1972 October agreement, the leaders of both regions of Vietnam 
were increasingly intransigent with negotiations. The Nixon administration, who were 
growing tired of failing negotiations, believed the only way to make Hanoi and Saigon 
negotiate would be to apply leverage over them both. For North Vietnam, this leverage came 
in the form of the December 1972 Operation Linebacker II. This chapter will address the 
intended targets of the bombing campaign; the incentives for Hanoi and Saigon; the return of 
American prisoners of war (POWs) and the final peace agreement. The evidence for this 
chapter includes the memoirs of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and Nixon’s annual 
foreign policy reports. However, most of the material used for this chapter will be taken from 
Volume IX of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vietnam, October 1972–
January 1973, which consists of memoranda and transcripts of conversation between 
members of the Nixon administration. This chapter will argue that while Operation 
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Linebacker II was not a particularly honourable strategy it managed to help influence the 
North Vietnamese to proceed with negotiations. 
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Chapter One – Nixon’s Linkage Policy 
 When Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States, he immediately 
recognised the need for a new approach to American foreign policy. After more than twenty 
years of American and Soviet commitment to Cold War ideologies, there was growing 
sentiment within the Nixon administration and the Soviet Union for improved international 
relations and détente. This feeling was further exacerbated by the ongoing war in Vietnam 
with supposed Communist opposition coming from the North Vietnamese. In addition, the 
United States had a similarly complicated relationship with Communist China, in 1949 when 
Mao Zedong initiated a Communist takeover of the Chinese government, the United States 
refused to recognise Mao’s new government and vetoed China from becoming a member of 
the United Nations. Nixon realised that a new stance on foreign policy was essential for peace 
within the world, in his memoirs Henry Kissinger proclaimed ‘our objective was to purge our 
foreign policy of all sentimentality.’16 The growing sentiment materialised from the Nixon 
administration in the form of realism or realpolitik; this indicated a more globalist view of the 
world and meant that the administration would deal with foreign policy more practically 
despite international ideologies or hostilities. In particular, Kissinger stated that realism 
indicated that ‘progress in superpower relations… had to be made on a broad front’ and thus 
‘events in different parts of the world… were related to each other.’17  
Nixon’s desire for improved international relations can be traced back to before he 
was elected President. In 1967, Nixon wrote an article for Foreign Affairs titled ‘Asia after 
Vietnam.’ The article outlined the importance of improved relations within the world and 
how this related to the war in Vietnam. To rebuild international relations within the world, 
Nixon argued that the West had to start working with the Communists to achieve long term 
                                                            
16 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 191 
17 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 129 
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peace goals, he stated ‘for the long run, it means pulling China back into the world 
community - but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicentre of world revolution.’18 
Additionally, Nixon recognised the growing dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam: ‘weary 
with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many 
Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.’19 According to Nixon, it was this 
‘new isolationism’ among Americans that would have an adverse effect on international 
relations; he believed that ‘to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to 
nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.’20 To isolate the Chinese 
would be disadvantageous to the improvement of world relations and Nixon inferred that an 
isolated Communist country served as a threat to its surrounding countries. The significance 
of Nixon’s statement lies in its allusion to the domino theory regarding Communist countries; 
this further outlined Nixon’s anti-Communist stance. Finally, Nixon concluded his article by 
stating that ‘the struggle for influence in the Third World is a three-way race among Moscow, 
Peking and the West’21 and born out from this was linkage policy, or what came to be known 
as triangular diplomacy, between the United States, the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China. 
This chapter will argue that linkage policy still had its own part to play in spurring on 
negotiations with the North Vietnamese. However, it was not solely intended to bring an end 
to the Vietnam War and it was not as significant as the Nixon administration perceived. 
Diplomatic manoeuvres from the Nixon administration were initiated to improve 
international relations, especially with Communist countries. This is important because even 
                                                            
18 Richard Nixon, ‘Asia After Vietnam’, Online by Foreign Affairs, 46, (October 1967) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam> 
19 Richard Nixon, ‘Asia After Vietnam’, Online by Foreign Affairs, 46, (October 1967) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam> 
20 Richard Nixon, ‘Asia After Vietnam’, Online by Foreign Affairs, 46, (October 1967) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam> 
21 Richard Nixon, ‘Asia After Vietnam’, Online by Foreign Affairs, 46, (October 1967) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam> 
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if these attempts were ineffectual in applying pressure on the North Vietnamese, it would 
show the world and the American public that Nixon could successfully negotiate with 
Communist countries to build peace without appeasing them. In essence, détente would 
provide an example to an international audience that diplomatic negotiations with the North 
Vietnamese were possible if they had been successful with the Soviet Union and China. To 
assess the impact of Nixon’s linkage policy this chapter will consider the following themes: 
the multiple intentions of linkage; the impact of the Linebacker II Operation on the linkage 
policy; and the potential successes of triangular diplomacy with regard to Soviet and Chinese 
pressures on North Vietnam. 
The intention and impact of the linkage policy has been widely debated within 
historiography. Orthodox historians, such as Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, tend to 
overemphasise the intention of the United States in improving relations to end the Vietnam 
War. For example, Logevall and Preston stated: ‘if America was to bring about “peace with 
honor” in Indochina, Nixon was going to need help from his new negotiating partners in 
Moscow and Beijing.’22 Additionally, Logevall and Preston argued that ‘Nixon and Kissinger 
expected both Moscow and Beijing to apply pressure on Hanoi to settle the war at least partly 
along the lines of peace with honor.’23 Revisionist historians have also argued that linkage 
was ineffective; however Jussi Hanhimaki stated that ‘the opening to China and the launch of 
triangular diplomacy had... not translated into an obvious American advantage in the Vietnam 
peace talks’24 due to the 1972 North Vietnamese Spring Offensive which ‘exposed the 
inherent limits and weaknesses of triangular diplomacy.’25 In contrast, post-revisionists such 
as Gabriel Kolko have argued that the cooling relations with the two Communist countries 
                                                            
22 Fredrik Logevall, Andrew Preston, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 13 
23 Logevall, Preston, Nixon in the World, p. 13 
24 Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, p. 152 
25 Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, p. 202 
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were a bigger part of Nixon’s foreign policy. Kolko argued that it was wrong to claim that the 
idea of linkage and triangular diplomacy were only initiated to end the war: ‘to help mobilize 
the Russians and/or the Chinese to pressure the DRV into ending the war on American terms 
would exaggerate the meaning of the next phase of Washington’s diplomacy, for both U.S. 
interests elsewhere in the world and domestic politics also defined its form.’26 Kolko further 
suggested that ‘triangular diplomacy on Vietnam seemed possible.’27 Qiang Zhai, another 
post-revisionist historian, has argued that improved relations between the United States, 
China and the Soviet Union meant that ‘policymakers in Hanoi had reason to worry that their 
two allies were susceptible to American pressures on Vietnam and that their support for the 
DRV might diminish if the war dragged on much longer.’28  
The growing disillusionment with the Vietnam conflict came from various parts of the 
globe; linkage was intended to reduce continued isolation of Communist countries and to 
encourage cooperation to build new structures of peace. In a report from the U.S. News and 
World Report, on September 16th 1968, Nixon stated: ‘we must not forget China. We must 
always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the U.S.S.R… we must not only watch for 
changes. We must seek to make changes.’29 Nixon’s statement brought the idea of 
cooperation with supposed enemies to the head of his foreign policy before he was elected 
President. Part of this cooperation was equated to the ‘revolution in the technology of war’;30 
Nixon argued that to ensure the world remained peaceful, ideologically opposed countries 
should work together to protect the prospects of peace. In the First Annual Foreign Policy 
                                                            
26 Kolko, Vietnam, p. 418 
27 Kolko, Vietnam, p. 415 
28 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000), p. 202 
29 Interview with Richard Nixon, (September 16, 1968), U.S. News and World Report, Online by 
BackIssues.com, <http://backissues.com/issue/US-News-and-World-Report-September-16-1968> 
30 Richard Nixon, ‘First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,’ 
February 18, 1970, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835> 
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Report, of February 18th, 1970, Nixon stated that ‘new types of weapons present new 
dangers. Communist China has acquired thermonuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and 
the United States have acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no 
matter which strikes first.’31 Therefore, Nixon’s statement indicated that linkage was partially 
intended to ensure such nuclear weapons would not be used against each other and to 
preserve peace among the powerful countries. As concluded in the First Annual Foreign 
Policy Report: ‘our attitude is clear-cut - a lasting peace will be impossible so long as some 
nations consider themselves the permanent enemies of others.’32  
The aims of triangular diplomacy were further indicated in Nixon’s 1971 Second 
Foreign Policy Report to Congress: ‘this Administration began with the conviction that a 
global structure of peace requires a strong but redefined American role. In other countries 
there was growing strength and autonomy. In our own there was nascent isolationism in 
reaction to overextension. In the light of these changed conditions, we could not continue on 
the old path.’33 This report indicated a dual purpose for the idea of linkage as Nixon referred 
to the domestic dissent in America.  Therefore, while there is evidence to suggest that linkage 
was intended to reduce the isolationism of Communist countries and bring an end to the 
Vietnam War, there is also evidence to suggest that this policy was aimed at rebuilding 
domestic support. If the Nixon administration could reconcile with Communist countries such 
as the Soviet Union and China, then the American public might be more likely to support 
Nixon in his effort for ‘peace with honour’ with the perceived Communist North Vietnamese. 
                                                            
31 Richard Nixon, ‘First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,’ 
February 18, 1970, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835> 
32 Richard Nixon, ‘First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,’ 
February 18, 1970, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835> 
33 Richard Nixon, ‘Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy’, February 25, 1971, 
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324> 
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However, there is no evidence to suggest that Nixon was appeasing the Communist 
superpowers; Nixon was particularly anti-Communist. Therefore, the opening to China would 
not be seen as a weakness of the Nixon administration because of Nixon’s anti-Communist 
stance. Furthermore, it was hoped that ending the Vietnam War would help to rebuild 
domestic consensus in the United States. Nixon outlined his idea of ‘peace with honour’ 
directly to the American Congress to show how honourable his foreign policy could be; he 
stated that ‘for our commitment to peace is most convincingly demonstrated in our 
willingness to negotiate our points of difference in a fair and business-like manner with the 
Communist countries. […] We are under no illusions. We know that there are enduring 
ideological differences.’34 
By 1972 the American economy had increasingly deteriorated due to continued 
involvement in the Vietnam War. As stated in Nixon’s Economic Report to Congress, from 
January 1972: ‘the annual rate of national defense spending declined by $25 billion from the 
fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 1971’35 due to Vietnamization of the war; 
however this meant that the U.S. had ‘urgent questions of unemployment, inflation, and the 
balance of payments.’36 There is evidence to suggest that there were economic motives for 
triangular diplomacy especially with regards to China. The National Security Study 
Memorandum 149, of March 10th 1972, indicated the Nixon administration’s desire for 
encouraging trade with the People’s Republic of China.37 This memorandum called for a 
study of ‘ways in which the US Government can begin and facilitate an exchange of general 
                                                            
34 Richard Nixon, ‘First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's’, 
February 18, 1970, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835> 
35 Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, (Washington: January 1972), The American 
Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1972.pdf> p. 19 
36 Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, (Washington: January 1972), The American 
Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1972.pdf> p. 20 
37 Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, (Washington: January 1972), The American 
Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1972.pdf> p. 173 
14 
 
trade information and data between the US and the PRC. The possible uses of our third-
country contact in this effort should be examined.’38 Furthermore, John Holdridge and Robert 
Hormats of the National Security Staff, indicated some of the U.S. objectives that were taken 
from the National Security Study: ‘our objectives should be to gradually improve trade 
relations, avoid giving the appearance of “rug merchants” intent on pushing our products, 
recognize that the PRC will require balance in trade, and gauge our actions based on 
consideration of PRC receptivity.’39 This additional evidence demonstrated Nixon’s desire to 
normalise relations with the People’s Republic of China in an attempt to tie together the 
Chinese and U.S. markets, this would certainly be advantageous to both countries especially 
for the U.S. since the continued involvement in an expensive war had slowed their economy. 
For this chapter Operation Linebacker II, 1972, (or the Christmas Bombings) served 
as a case study to examine the impact of Nixon’s linkage on diplomatic relations in the 
Vietnam War. When negotiations stalemated between the North and South Vietnamese, the 
Nixon administration returned to military operations in an attempt to resume serious 
negotiations. Meanwhile, Nixon was trying to normalize relations with China and 
simultaneously the Soviet Union and U.S. were pressing for détente. However, there was 
hesitation about Operation Linebacker II as it was believed it might have a negative impact 
on diplomacy and linkage with the Communist countries. For example, the President’s 
Deputy Assistant Haig sent a memo to Henry Kissinger stating that he ‘must give most 
careful consideration to messages which should be given to the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China. In the case of the Soviet Union, we should stress the themes of 
                                                            
38 National Security Study Memorandum 149, Washington, March 10, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v17/d211> 
39 Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), March 30, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v17/d217> 
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our desire to settle…’ 40 Additionally, Haig stated that due to Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts 
with China, he would have to be ‘even more delicate especially in the context of your 
scheduled trip to China, the increased activity in the buffer zone and the importance of 
China’s at least having our rationale covering the reason for the breakdown.’41 This was 
important as it showed how the Americans perceived the significance of Soviet and Chinese 
influence over the North Vietnamese. However, the administration had few options left to 
convince both Vietnamese sides to negotiate for a peace agreement. Following the failure of 
the 1968 Tet Offensive, it was deemed unlikely that a military solution could be reached in 
the region. A CIA study from September 1969, indicated that in the Paris negotiations ‘a new 
political program and new political organizations have been introduced to help shift the 
struggle from the military to the political realm.’42 
One of the reasons that Operation Linebacker II was significant can be attributed to 
the ‘accidental’ damage caused by the American Air Force to ships owned by the Soviet 
Union, China, Poland and France, when the bombings were initiated above the 20th parallel.43 
The importance of this lay in the response of China and the Soviet Union to the destruction of 
their ships. A message from Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Staff stated that 
‘we have received protests from the Soviets and the Poles for damage to ships in Haiphong 
                                                            
40 Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 13, 1972, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d173> 
41 Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 13, 1972, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d173> 
42 Memorandum From John Holdridge of the Operations Staff of the National Security Council to the President's 
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 30, 1969, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d128> 
43 Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the 
Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Vogt), December 22, 1972, 8:26 a.m., Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d217> 
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Harbor. The Soviet protest was relatively low key and received little publicity.’44 
Furthermore, two days later in a conversation between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Thomas Moorer, and the Deputy Commander of U.S. Military Assistance, John Vogt; 
Moorer expressed his surprise that the Americans had destroyed Russian ships but ‘the funny 
part about it is the Russians aren’t saying one word.’45 Kissinger stated in conversation with 
H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, that the reaction from the North Vietnamese, the 
Soviets and the Chinese were all fairly subdued, he claimed that the North Vietnamese ‘came 
in and just read a statement denouncing the bombings… at the end of that statement, they 
proposed another meeting for Saturday. So far, the Chinese reaction has been very mild. The 
Soviet reaction has been very mild. We may get an agreement out of this.’46 The reactions 
were significant as the Soviets and Chinese lacked any real severe reaction to ‘accidental’ 
bombings of their own ships. The evidence suggested that the lack of retaliation was due to 
the influence of Nixon’s linkage policy and thus his desire to improve relations with 
Communist countries may have had an effect. However, the lack of protest from the Soviets 
and Chinese might also have been due to a desire to avoid international inquiry about why 
their ships were in the Haiphong Harbor at the time. 
Further evidence to suggest linkage might have helped Nixon’s chances of spurring 
on negotiations with the North Vietnamese in spite of Operation Linebacker II comes from 
the PRC. On December 29th, 1972, toward the final bombings, the Chairman of the 
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Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong advised Nguyen Thi Binh, one of the Vietnamese 
Communist leaders, to proceed with negotiations alongside America and the South 
Vietnamese. Mao explained that North Vietnam could ‘achieve a certain degree of 
normalization with the Americans.’47 As stated by Henry Kissinger: ‘the Chinese made a 
protest about the ship we hit and did about the absolute minimum that they could do—they 
protested orally in Paris not even in our channel—and then when our man there asked them 
whether they had a written note, they said oh no, no we said all we are going to say and they 
said that our air operations threaten China security.’48 It was important for the Chinese to 
remain on better terms with the Americans than the North Vietnamese as the PRC wanted to 
be an internationally recognised country. Therefore, since it was the U.S. that vetoed their 
admission to the United Nations, to normalise relations with America would certainly help 
the PRC achieve their goal.  
Orthodox historians, such as Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, have argued that 
both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China were unwilling to discuss 
negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Logevall and Preston claimed that despite the efforts 
of Nixon’s linkage policy, it ‘turned out that Soviets and Chinese were not particularly 
willing to apply pressure to the North Vietnamese.’49 However, there is available evidence 
from both powers which suggested that the Chinese and the Soviets did voice their opinions 
to the North Vietnamese to proceed with negotiations, but only as advice not as instruction. 
As Raymond Garthoff argued: ‘the Nixon administration, to its credit, never believed that the 
Soviet Union or China was responsible for and in direct command or control of the North 
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Vietnamese… this clarity of perception permitted the administration to see – and to pursue – 
possibilities for triangular diplomacy that had not previously been adequately recognized at 
the policy level.’50 However, Qiang Zhai has argued that because China and the Soviet Union 
both displayed interest in renewing relations with America; ‘policymakers in Hanoi had 
reason to worry that their two allies were susceptible to American pressures on Vietnam and 
that their support for the DRV might diminish if the war dragged on much longer.’51 
In Kissinger’s meetings with the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, it 
was further explained that the Soviet Union did not have the authority over the North 
Vietnamese to force an agreement. Raymond Garthoff argued that ‘Dobrynin protested that 
Moscow had only limited influence with the leaders in Hanoi, but promised that the Soviet 
leaders would do what they could to forward the American negotiating proposals.’52 
Therefore, Garthoff suggested, despite limited influence, Moscow was more than willing to 
apply pressure onto North Vietnam. There is further evidence for this argument in a message 
between Al Haig and Henry Kissinger, Haig stated that he ‘told Dobrynin that quite frankly 
while we had no objective time pressure to settle that patience was wearing thin. He urged me 
to provide him with a prompt readout of the results of this afternoon’s meeting, stating that 
Moscow was using its good offices to bring Hanoi in line.’53 The evidence therefore suggests 
that by linking different issues, Nixon was able to take advantage of any potential influence 
that the Soviets and Chinese had over Hanoi. This influence and desire for improved relations 
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between the three countries meant that they could not isolate the problems that were 
occurring in North Vietnam as they were all involved in some way. 
Further evidence of Soviet pressures comes from conversations between Nixon and 
Kissinger in late 1972. Nixon stated that it was disputes between the Chinese and the Soviets 
that caused the Communist superpowers to pressure the North Vietnamese into negotiation 
rather than actually defend them; he argued that ‘they [the Soviets] hate the Chinese. The 
Chinese want to get it over, because they have other fish to fry with us. But neither of them 
can get caught not helping the North Vietnamese as long as it goes on.’54 Therefore, the 
evidence supports the argument that the combination of improved relations between America 
and the Communist countries and the deteriorating relationship between the Chinese and the 
Soviets had an influence on negotiations with the North Vietnamese. However, this should 
not be overstated; diplomatic negotiations between the three countries could not play a major 
part in the peace process due to limited influence that the Communist superpowers had over 
the North Vietnamese. Nixon stated, with regard to pressuring Hanoi to negotiate: ‘there’s 
still a chance for a settlement. The Russians are pressuring them. The Chinese, maybe. But, 
the main point is what is pressuring them the most is the fact that the military situation for 
them is damn bad. It’s bad and critical.’55 
The Soviet Union was not alone in encouraging the North Vietnamese to proceed with 
negotiations. There is evidence to suggest that the People’s Republic of China also attempted 
to persuade the North Vietnamese to settle an agreement with America. On July 12th 1972,  
                                                            
54 Conversation Among President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, and the President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 16, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d181>  
55 Conversation Among President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, and the President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 16, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d181> 
20 
 
Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the People’s Republic of China met with Le Duc Tho in Beijing to 
advise the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to negotiate. Zhou stated that ‘on the one hand, it 
is necessary to prepare for fighting.  On the other hand, you have to negotiate.’56 Zhou 
attempted to convince Tho that the North Vietnamese could drop their requirement for 
Nguyen Van Thieu to be removed as President of South Vietnam. Additionally, Zhou stated 
that to recognise Thieu as part of future coalition government would have meant that ‘the US 
will see that Thieu is sharing power in that government, and therefore, find it easier to accept 
a political solution.’57 However, in this discussion the limits of Chinese influence were 
present, as Zhou stated: ‘of course how to solve this problem is your job.  However, as 
comrades, we would like to refer to our experience.’58 The evidence from the Chinese 
officials acknowledged the limited influence they had over the North Vietnamese. Therefore, 
Zhou’s statement supports the argument that advice from the People’s Republic of China was 
not instructive and certainly would have no instant impact on the North Vietnamese. 
However, on October 8th 1972, in negotiations with Kissinger, Le Duc Tho did 
exactly what Zhou had advised and dropped the requirement of the removal of Thieu. In this 
discussion Tho laid out new terms for negotiations: ‘in this new proposal we do not demand 
the formation of a Government of National Concord before the ceasefire, but we will let the 
two South Vietnamese do this work, three months after the ceasefire at the latest. And this is 
what you yourself have proposed, the same proposal.’59 The evidence from the October 
negotiations suggested a parallel between the recommendations of the Chinese Premier and 
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the North Vietnamese revised proposals. Therefore this supports the argument that despite 
limited influence, the advice from the PRC might have had a limited impact on Hanoi. 
However, as previously quoted in this chapter, Nixon outlined the dire state of the North 
Vietnamese military so Chinese pressures should not be overstated. However, there is further 
evidence to suggest that the People’s Republic of China continued their advice to the North 
Vietnamese to proceed with negotiations. In a conversation that coincided with the end of 
Operation Linebacker II, Zhou told Vietnamese Communist political leader Truong Chinh 
that ‘it seems that Nixon is truly planning to leave [Vietnam]. Therefore, this time it is 
necessary to negotiate [with them] seriously, and the goal is to reach an agreement.  Of 
course, you also need to prepare [for the possibility] that the negotiations will not result in an 
agreement, and that some setbacks may occur before [the agreement is finally reached].’60 
This evidence further suggested that the Chinese were determined to get an agreement 
reached in Vietnam. 
It would be an overstatement to claim that linkage politics and improved international 
relations was a decisive factor in the North Vietnamese decision to proceed to an agreement. 
However, it would be too limited to claim that linkage politics had no effect on diplomacy 
and that the Soviet Union and Chinese were unwilling to increase pressure over the North 
Vietnamese, as argued by Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston. Furthermore, as Qiang Zhai 
argued ‘despite the North Vietnamese claim that they had not been affected by the changes in 
Sino-American and Soviet-American relations, the unfolding U.S. rapprochement with China 
and the Soviet Union undermined Hanoi’s interests. The limitations of both Soviet and 
Chinese aid seriously constrained Hanoi’s approach to Washington.’61 
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Nixon’s Fourth Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy from 1973 is 
particularly indicative of the success of triangular diplomacy and linkage. One of the main 
achievements of Nixon’s foreign policy given in his report was the opening to China and 
reconciliations of relations. Nixon stated:  
Three years of careful groundwork produced an historic turning point in our relations 
with the People's Republic of China. My conversations with Chinese leaders in 
February 1972 re-established contact between the world’s most powerful and the 
world's most populous countries, thereby transforming the postwar landscape. The 
journey to Peking launched a process with immense potential for the betterment of 
our peoples and the building of peace in Asia and the world. Since then we have 
moved to concrete measures which are improving relations and creating more positive 
conditions in the region. China is becoming fully engaged with us and the world. The 
process is not inexorable, however. Both countries will have to continue to exercise 
restraint and contribute to a more stable environment.62  
 
The second achievement stated by Nixon: ‘the attainment of an honorable settlement in 
Vietnam was the most satisfying development of this past year.’63 Nixon explained that this 
achievement was due to American ‘firmness in Southeast Asia and the maintenance of 
durable partnerships with … other Asian [countries] … made it possible for us to reach out to 
other adversaries.’64 According to Nixon, this had two important consequences for 
international peace relations: ‘The People's Republic of China has become more fully 
engaged in the world scene; much more than before, it is making its contributions to shaping 
the international order’65 and now the Nixon administration ‘would work with Moscow 
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across a broad front, believing that progress in one area would induce progress in others.’66 
Nixon’s report indicated the importance given to the success of the linkage policy by his 
administration. As Gabriel Kolko argued it was the combination of  Nixon’s ‘three-pronged 
strategy of diplomacy over the head of the DRV, threats of escalation, and Vietnamization, 
each of which aided the other by buying time’67 that helped to secure a final agreement with 
the North Vietnamese. However, there were other factors involved in Nixon’s ‘peace with 
honour’.  
To conclude, as Nixon stated in his final 1973 Foreign Policy Report: ‘our approach 
to the Vietnam conflict and our shaping of a new foreign policy were inextricably linked.’68 
This chapter has argued that the linkage policy was a significant part of Nixon’s ‘peace with 
honour’ and it certainly played a part in spurring on negotiations. Firstly, this chapter has 
shown that linkage had multiple intentions: it was designed to help encourage negotiations 
with the North Vietnamese; to encourage peaceful relations around the globe; to end potential 
threats of nuclear attacks by Communist superpowers; and to increase domestic support in the 
U.S. for American foreign policy. With regards to the historiographical debate, this chapter 
has opposed Logevall and Preston’s argument; as it appeared too simplistic by assuming that 
triangular diplomacy was only initiated for reasons to do with the Vietnam War. Secondly, 
this chapter used the case study of Operation Linebacker 1972 to assess whether bombing 
negatively affected linkage politics. Hanhimaki argued that linkage had no real benefit for the 
Nixon administration and limited the intention of triangular diplomacy to the United States 
attempting to end the war simply through the supply lines of the Soviet Union and China.69  
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However, evidence suggested that due to subdued reactions of the Communist superpowers 
when U.S. bombing accidentally destroyed Soviet and Chinese property, the Communists 
were still supportive of improved relations with America. This evidence suggests that without 
triangular diplomacy and the desire of both Americans and Soviets for détente, such reactions 
would not have been previously possible. Therefore, linkage helped to spur on negotiations 
through improved relations with Communist powers. The third part of this chapter was aimed 
at emphasising that despite the Vietnam War not being a Cold War battle and aid being 
supplied to North Vietnam from the Communist countries, there is evidence that displays the 
Soviets and Chinese advising North Vietnam to reach an agreement with the U.S.  This 
chapter does not attempt to argue that the Soviets and Chinese were decisive in pressuring the 
North Vietnamese, as both countries admitted they had limited influence. However, the 
example of the Premier of the People’s Republic of China advice to the North Vietnamese 
suggested that they may have played in part in spurring on negotiations. In essence the impact 
of linkage and triangular diplomacy should not be over exaggerated, there is evidence to 
support the argument that the Communist powers had an impact on the North Vietnamese but 
it was neither the sole intention of the policy nor the only influence on Hanoi to proceed with 
peace agreements.  
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Chapter Two: The Vietnamization Strategy 
The strategy of Vietnamization was designed to strengthen the defence of the South 
Vietnamese forces in order to allow American troops to be withdrawn from Vietnam. As 
explained by Nixon, this was not a particularly new strategy in Vietnam foreign policy; in the 
same vein Lyndon Johnson’s administration thought up ‘de-Americanisation’ which similarly 
shifted the responsibility onto the South Vietnamese.70 However, it was not until Nixon took 
office that the strategy was fully committed to. The growing disillusionment with the 
Vietnam War amongst the American people was one of the leading incentives for Nixon to 
go ahead with Vietnamization; it was hoped that this strategy would result in continual 
withdrawals of American troops and a reduction in American losses of life. Henry Kissinger 
stated that ‘the new Nixon administration started studying the withdrawals of American 
troops for two reasons: to win public support and give Hanoi an incentive to negotiate 
seriously by enhancing the staying power of our remaining forces.’71 Therefore, while U.S. 
withdrawals would reduce leverage over the North Vietnamese in negotiations; it was hoped 
that Vietnamization would be effective in strengthening South Vietnamese forces. 
Furthermore, the intention was that increased strength of South Vietnam would make up for 
reduced U.S. presence and would provide an ideal substitute for U.S. leverage. 
The strategy for Vietnamization of the war in Nixon’s first term as President evolved 
from early 1969 National Security Memoranda and Nixon’s speech held in Guam on July 25th 
1969, which informally outlined the plans for the ‘Nixon Doctrine’. National Security Study 
Memorandum 1, from January 21st 1969, by Henry Kissinger called for the Nixon 
administration to evaluate ‘in what different ways (including innovations in organization) 
might U.S. force-levels be reduced to various levels, while minimizing impact on combat 
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capability?’72 On April 10th 1969, National Security Study Memorandum 36 required the 
Nixon administration to draw up a timetable that would ‘be directed toward the progressive 
transfer to the South Vietnamese of the fighting effort with the US and other TCCs 
increasingly in support roles.73 The evidence suggested that the Nixon administration was 
unwilling to abandon its South Vietnamese allies and reduction of U.S. troop levels was 
dependent on the capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  
Nixon’s speech in Guam, from July 25th 1969, informally announced to an 
international audience the intention of American foreign policy and outlined the strategy of 
Vietnamization. Nixon stated that regarding military defence of countries ‘the United States 
is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled 
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.74 He added that ‘from 
my preliminary conversations with several Asian leaders over the past few months that they 
are going to be willing to undertake this responsibility. It will not be easy.’75 This speech was 
significant as it outlined the reasons for the Vietnamization of the war. Nixon believed that 
the South Vietnamese needed to have more responsibility to ultimately make themselves a 
stronger nation, he argued that ‘if the United States just continues down the road of 
responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending 
these countries when they have internal problems or external problems, they are never going 
to take care of themselves.’76 In other words, if the South Vietnamese remained reliant on the 
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U.S. they would never have the strength to fight off future aggressors when American troops 
were fully withdrawn from Vietnam. 
The intended purpose and the eventual impact of Vietnamization have been widely 
debated by historians. The more orthodox historians tend to be critical of most of Nixon’s 
Vietnam policies and they have argued that Vietnamization was not a viable solution to 
ending the Vietnam War. For example, Lien-Hang T. Nguyen believed that the only real 
purpose of Vietnamization was ‘staving off public disapproval with the war’77 and argued 
that Nixon was just trying to ‘win’78 the war. Similarly, Jussi Hanhimaki argued that Nixon’s 
strategy had little impact on his foreign policy ambitions and stated ‘Vietnamization did little 
to achieve peace with honour.’79 Some historians have rather extremely claimed that the U.S. 
was trying to prolong the war with this strategy for example, Rocky M. Mirza argued that 
‘Vietnamization was another lie to continue the Vietnam War.’80 Revisionists, however, have 
argued that some gains were made by the Vietnamization strategy. Guenter Lewy argued that 
‘there is general agreement that during these years of American disengagement the 
effectiveness of RVNAF increased significantly.’81 Similarly, George C. Herring argued that 
‘Vietnamization was in full swing by early 1970, and most observers agreed that significant 
gains had been made.’82 
This chapter will argue that the strategy of Vietnamization was one of the aspects of 
Nixon’s ‘peace with honour’ which attempted to spur on negotiations with the North 
Vietnamese. It can be argued that this strategy was particularly ‘honourable’ because the 
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Nixon administration did not impulsively initiate unilateral withdrawal of American forces in 
Vietnam; instead they attempted to increase the security and defence of the South 
Vietnamese. Therefore, if their plan succeeded the North Vietnamese might be more inclined 
to fully participate in negotiations. As indicated by Nixon on February 18th 1970: ‘what 
alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued allied success? If they 
choose to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war, could they simply wait out U.S. 
withdrawals and then, through reinvigorated efforts, seize the initiative again and defeat the 
South Vietnamese forces?’83 Therefore, this chapter will argue that Vietnamization was the 
best and most honourable strategy for the Nixon administration. First of all, this strategy 
helped with U.S. domestic support due to increased troop withdrawals, lower casualty rates 
and lower war expenses. Secondly, the strategy was intended to spur on negotiations with the 
North Vietnamese by making the South more self-reliant and self-determined; it was hoped 
that this would make them stronger so that they would not have to rely on other countries for 
defence in the future. Thirdly, there are examples that suggested Vietnamization succeeded, 
such as reports from Sir Robert Thompson and the increased role of the ARVN especially 
with regard to the Lam Son 719 Operation 1971. As argued by Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s 
foreign policy was intended as a ‘dual-track strategy of Vietnamization and negotiations. And 
it made the point that Vietnamization offered a prospect of honourable disengagement that 
was not hostage to the other side’s cooperation.’84  
The policy of Vietnamization, if it was to succeed, would have political benefits for 
the Nixon administration. If the American troops could successfully transfer the burden of the 
war to the South Vietnamese, whilst not reducing the strength of the combined military, then 
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the Nixon administration could proceed with American withdrawal without any detrimental 
effect on the war effort. The increased troop withdrawal, it was hoped, would thus quieten or 
even slightly reduce domestic opposition in the U.S, as Kissinger stated ‘troop cuts poulticed 
public sores at home.’85 Vietnamization meant that troop withdrawals would be gradual 
dependent upon the strength of South Vietnamese forces. The Nixon administration did not 
want to withdraw unilaterally because it would severely weaken the South Vietnamese and as 
Kissinger explained there was still a ‘lingering hope that Hanoi might at some point 
negotiate.’86 Melvin Laird, one of the major architects of Vietnamization, had explained his 
‘major concern was to get the United States out of Vietnam before we lost too much domestic 
support. But he wanted to do so without a collapse of the South Vietnamese.’87 Once again, 
Vietnamization meant that the Nixon administration would be walking a tightrope between 
losing domestic support and losing the South Vietnamese to the opposition. 
As Nixon explained in his foreign policy, many critics of the war argued that the 
Nixon administration should either ‘escalate in an attempt to impose a military solution on 
the battlefield’88 or ‘liquidate our presence immediately, cut our losses, and leave the South 
Vietnamese on their own.’89 However, neither of these actions presented Nixon’s 
administration with the peace or honour that was desired. Nixon therefore argued that 
Vietnamization was his best chance for success; he explained ‘in many respects 
Vietnamization would be far more damaging to the Communists than an escalation that, as 
Thompson had pointed out, would not solve the basic problem of South Vietnam 
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preparedness, and that would stir up serious domestic problems in America.’90 Nixon’s 
statement supports the argument that Vietnamization provided one of the best opportunities to 
keep the American public on side. On November 3rd 1969, Nixon made his ‘Silent Majority’ 
speech calling on those who were not against the war to express their support. However, the 
speech indicated that the Americans ‘were going to continue fighting until the Communists 
agreed to negotiate a fair and honourable or until the South Vietnamese were able to defend 
themselves on their own.’91 The significance of this speech lay in the response of the 
American public and the increased support for Nixon’s Vietnam policy. An article from the 
New York Times on November 5th 1969, stated: ‘a Gallup telephone poll indicated that 77 per 
cent of those who had listened to the speech last night favoured Mr. Nixon’s policies.’92 
Successful Vietnamization of the war would hopefully result in increased withdrawals 
of Americans. Nixon anticipated that the American public would be convinced further that he 
was serious about negotiations by withdrawing more troops. In this way, the blame for the 
continuation of the war would be shifted to the North Vietnamese and Nixon hoped that 
criticism of his policies would be redirected. For example, in October 1970 Nixon made two 
announcements: ‘in addition to a cease-fire in place throughout Indochina... I announced that 
40,000 more troops would be withdrawn by Christmas... these two moves went so far toward 
removing the obstacles to a settlement that they effectively silenced the domestic antiwar 
movement by placing the burden squarely on the North Vietnamese.’93 These announcements 
meant that it would be harder for domestic opposition in the U.S. to criticise Nixon as the 
burden of ending the war would be placed on the North Vietnamese, thus supporting the 
argument that Vietnamization was the best option for the U.S. 
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There were other ways in which Vietnamization could help reduce criticism of the 
Nixon administration. Transferring the burden of the war onto the South Vietnamese would 
mean that U.S. casualty rates would drop as American troops could be withdrawn. This 
argument can be supported by the significant decrease in U.S. casualty rates from 1969 to 
1972. In 1969, when Nixon was elected President, casualty rates stood at 11,780 but by 1972 
this number had decreased to 759.94 In addition, the U.S. economy was suffering partly due to 
the ongoing war in Vietnam, if the U.S. could transfer the burden of the war to the South 
Vietnamese then their expenses would also be reduced. In Nixon’s 1971 Economic Report to 
Congress it was stated that there was a transition ‘from a wartime to a peacetime economy 
and from a higher to a lower rate of inflation, [and this] would inevitably be accompanied by 
some decline in output and rise in unemployment.’95 As stated by Kissinger in a 
memorandum to Nixon: ‘Vietnamization has worked two pressures on Hanoi to negotiate a 
settlement, while buying time at home with the steady decline of U.S. forces, casualties, and 
expenses.’96 
There were some doubts within the Nixon administration on whether troop 
withdrawals would be disadvantageous to negotiations. Most of the doubts came from Henry 
Kissinger who argued that ‘the more automatic our withdrawal, the less useful it was as a 
bargaining weapon.’97 Therefore, the Nixon administration attempted to balance their strategy 
between leverage over the North Vietnamese and domestic support; Kissinger argued ‘our 
present strategy was trying to walk a fine line... between withdrawing too fast to convince 
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Hanoi of our determination and withdrawing too slowly to satisfy the American public.’98 
However, even Kissinger recognised that ‘the only real alternatives to Vietnamization were 
immediate withdrawal or... escalation.’99 The other solutions would potentially have had 
destructive consequences for a peace agreement to end the war. Kissinger also recognised the 
significance of Vietnamization in a memorandum to Nixon: ‘first, it told the North 
Vietnamese that they had to pay a price to get us out of the South quickly and totally. Second, 
it painted the prospect of the South Vietnamese government growing stronger and perhaps 
able to make it on its own.’100 Therefore, while withdrawals might have impeded on Nixon’s 
negotiating stance, it was hoped that Vietnamization and the build-up of South Vietnam 
would be the best substitute for American troops. 
To assess the potential successes of Vietnamization, this part of the chapter will look 
at how the strategy benefitted both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese based on the 
information gathered by the Americans. The available evidence from the Nixon 
administration suggested that Vietnamization was successful and therefore troop withdrawals 
continued. Although there may be debate over how successful Vietnamization was, it is 
important to realise that the information being given to Nixon indicated success. Therefore, it 
becomes more difficult to criticise Nixon for continually withdrawing troops if the South 
Vietnamese were not ready because this was not the information that he received. The 
counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson provided Nixon with multiple reports over 
the course of four years which suggested that Vietnamization was working. In 1969, 
Kissinger stated that Thompson’s report indicated the following: ‘there has been great 
improvement in the military and political picture, and we have a winning position. We need 
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continued application of the “do it yourself” concept for the GVN and confidence in 
correctness of our policy.’101 In 1971, another of Thompson’s reports indicated that ‘there is 
nothing to worry about in the pacification program…You can safely accelerate U.S. 
withdrawals to the point where the U.S. force level will total about 50,000 by next June 30, 
and will consist primarily of tactical air, helicopter support, and servicing elements for 
military assistance.’102 Furthermore, following the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive of 
1972, Thompson indicated that Vietnamization was working; he concluded that ‘the North 
Vietnamese offensive has been militarily defeated and has caused little damage to the 
Vietnamization and Pacification programs.’103 
The advantages of successful Vietnamization for the South Vietnamese were 
indicated in Nixon’s foreign policy reports. In the Second Annual Report to Congress on 
United States Foreign Policy, Nixon stated that ‘two years ago there was no assurance that 
the South Vietnamese could undertake large-scale military operations on their own. Now, 
they have proven their ability to do so.’104 For the Americans this ability meant that they 
could reduce their role in the war and thus pacify domestic opposition. Nixon further 
recognised the South Vietnamese efforts in making sure that Vietnamization succeeded: ‘this 
progress has been made possible largely by the efforts of the South Vietnamese. It is they 
who have compensated for the reduced U.S. effort. It is they who now carry the major part of 
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the burden and are progressively taking on more.’105 One of the intended aspects of 
Vietnamization was to display South Vietnamese confidence in their own strength. It was 
hoped that the North Vietnamese would recognise the increased strength and confidence of 
the South Vietnamese despite American troop withdrawals and therefore be more willing to 
proceed with an agreement to end the war. In the Third Annual Report to Congress on United 
States Foreign Policy from 1972, Nixon displayed much confidence in the abilities of the 
South Vietnamese: ‘as our role has diminished, South Vietnam has been able increasingly to 
meet its own defence needs and provide growing security to its people.’106 
Pacification was an additional strand of Vietnamization which was intended to help 
the South Vietnamese increase their defences in the countryside, proliferate support for the 
regime and push back enemy forces. As stated by Nixon: ‘American withdrawal is the 
primary reflection of Vietnamization while pacification is its primary goal.’107 In his 1969 
foreign policy report, Nixon identified the main objectives for the pacification programme: 
‘(1) an adequate defense, and (2) a fully functioning government resident in the hamlet 24 
hours a day. If the Government can achieve these two objectives, it can prevent the enemy 
from subverting and terrorizing the population or mobilizing it for its own purposes.’108 In 
essence, the hamlets in the countryside should be impenetrable by outside enemy forces. 
Within later foreign policy reports, Nixon explained some of the main successes of the 
pacification program: ‘the enemy's main force units have been pushed farther away from 
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population centers, the task of extending governmental presence has become progressively 
easier.’109 The result of this was that ‘over 80 percent of the total population of South 
Vietnam, including the six million urban dwellers and eight million in rural areas, is under 
effective Government control’110 and ‘now the enemy mounts very few significant 
operations... Pacification has made steady progress throughout these two years.’111 Nixon 
concluded by stating that ‘more South Vietnamese now receive government protection and 
services than at any time in the past decade.’112 If more of the South Vietnamese areas were 
under effective control of their government this meant that the need for American forces in 
these areas was reduced and thus Nixon could afford to continue withdrawals.  
The advantages of successful Vietnamization for America were indicated by Nixon in 
his Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 25th 
1971. In this report, Nixon specified various aspects of the Vietnamization strategy that 
succeeded for example: ‘troop levels have dropped at a steady rate. The process will 
continue’;113 ‘American combat deaths... the decline has been constant’;114 the decline in the 
‘ratio of South Vietnamese forces to American forces in Vietnam... today it is more than 3 ½ 
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to 1’;115 and the decline in ‘the ratio of South Vietnamese to American major engagements... 
now it is about 16 to 1.’116 In addition, Nixon’s Third Annual Report to Congress on Foreign 
Policy stated that ‘our ground combat role has effectively ended… As I write this Report, our 
troop level has dropped below 139,000-and will be no higher than 69,000 by the first day of 
May. In December 1971 our combat deaths were down to 17. Air sorties, budget costs, draft 
calls--all have sharply declined.’117 Nixon’s reports showed that Vietnamization gradually 
achieved its desired intentions to benefit the U.S. politically and economically. With regards 
to the 1971 Lam Son 719 operation, Nixon stated ‘because of the problem of American 
domestic opinion and because the South Vietnamese wanted to prove how successful 
Vietnamization had been, we decided that the operation would be an ARVN exercise; the 
United States would supply only air cover and artillery support.’118 The evidence suggested 
that if Vietnamization had been unworthy then the ARVN would have not been able to take 
on the military responsibility of the Lam Son 719 operation. Furthermore, it also revealed the 
increased confidence of the South Vietnamese in their own abilities, as argued by Nixon: 
‘Vietnamization made very encouraging advances during 1970. The fundamental question 
remains: can the South Vietnamese fully stand on their own against a determined enemy? We 
– and more importantly the South Vietnamese – are confident that they can.’119  
In an address to the nation on Vietnam from May 14th 1969, Nixon outlined his 
intention for the political future of South Vietnam: ‘we seek the opportunity for the South 
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Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.’120 It 
is argued by historians, such as Leslie H. Gelb, that Nixon’s statement simply inferred that 
the U.S. would ‘allow the Vietcong and Saigon regime to slug it out on the battlefield or in 
the ballot box... [and] the United States would accept the verdict whoever the victor might 
be.’121 However, Gelb’s simplistic argument can be opposed by Nixon’s previously 
mentioned speech.  In Nixon’s address to the nation, he referred to the South Vietnamese 
having no ‘outside interference’ with their political issues. It is important to recognise that 
Nixon might have also been referring to the United States in this as well as enemy 
Communist countries, as it was not their or anyone else’s prerogative to decide the South 
Vietnamese political future. 
Nixon’s final Foreign Policy Report to Congress, stated that he wanted ‘to seek a just 
peace, we pursued two distinct but mutually supporting courses of action: Negotiations and 
Vietnamization.’122 It is suggested by Nixon in the final report that Vietnamization was 
intended to support negotiations to ultimately bring the war in Vietnam to an end; he further 
argued that ‘Vietnamization is not a substitute for negotiations, but a spur to negotiations.’123 
Therefore, Vietnamization intended to strengthen the South Vietnamese in a multitude of 
ways and it was hoped that the North Vietnamese would recognise this and be more inclined 
to negotiate. In a report to Congress in 1972, Nixon argued: ‘I am convinced that the United 
States can set itself no more worthy goal than fostering in Asia the self-reliance that made our 
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own nation great.’ 124 Nixon’s statement was significant as it alluded to America’s own 
struggle for independence which provided an example of a developing country’s successful 
self-determination. As agreed in the Paris Peace Accords, 1973: ‘the South Vietnamese 
people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all 
countries.’125 Therefore, the evidence suggests that this strand of Vietnamization was an 
attempt to spur on negotiations; to convince both the North and South Vietnamese that 
independence could be achieved through the strength and determination of any country. 
The strategy of Vietnamization emphasised self-determination of the South 
Vietnamese, not only toward military aspects but also toward political problems. Of course, 
the United States wanted to play a supporting role but the Nixon administration believed that 
it was not their responsibility or right to put in place a political faction that might not have 
been internationally recognised or supported. In essence the U.S. wanted to give the South 
Vietnamese the ability to defend themselves and determine the way their country was run; 
something which was threatened by the North Vietnamese. As stated in the Third Foreign 
Policy Report: ‘we are ready to reach an agreement which allows the South Vietnamese to 
determine their own future without outside interference. This goal can be reached whenever 
Hanoi distinguishes between a settlement and a surrender.’126 It was the intention of the U.S. 
to give the South Vietnamese a basic platform to work from and build up, in this way the 
Nixon administration could be seen as honourable for providing assistance to help a 
struggling country instead of taking charge of the situation. Nixon stated: ‘it was vital to 
reach a settlement that would provide a framework for South Vietnamese self-determination 
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and for our honorable disengagement.’127 It was argued by Nixon that it was never a goal of 
the U.S. to become victorious against the North Vietnamese both militarily and politically, he 
stated ‘we did not seek to impose a political victory, any more than a military victory, but we 
were not prepared to impose a political defeat.’128 Therefore, the evidence from the Foreign 
Policy Reports support the argument that Vietnamization also had an honourable political 
agenda aimed at increasing the confidence of a country that was under threat from an enemy 
and the Nixon administration did not want to overplay their role as they were attempting to 
wind down their involvement. As stated in the 1973 Paris Peace Accords: ‘the South 
Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through 
genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.’129 
It would be unfair to criticise Nixon’s administration for separating the political and 
military issues as Nixon and Kissinger believed that they had no right to impose any political 
influence. This argument can be supported by Nixon’s 1973 Foreign Policy Report: ‘we 
preferred to concentrate on those aspects of a settlement that directly involved us--the 
military activity, withdrawals, and prisoners. We felt the political future should be negotiated 
by the South Vietnamese themselves, hopefully in a calmer atmosphere.’130 From Nixon’s 
statement it can be concluded that once the military problems had ended in Vietnam, it was 
hoped that the South Vietnamese would be strong enough to defend and support their own 
political faction and to negotiate with the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, in Chapter IV, 
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Article 9 of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords it was stated that ‘foreign countries shall not 
impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.’131 It would 
have been problematic for the Nixon administration to try and solve the political problems in 
Vietnam as it might have run the risk of condemnation from other countries. Therefore the 
evidence suggested that the U.S. acted honourably in aiding the defence of the South 
Vietnamese political problems.  
To conclude, Nixon stated in the final Foreign Policy Report: ‘we sought peace with 
honor - through negotiation if possible, through Vietnamization if the enemy gave us no 
choice.’ 132 The first part of this chapter argued that Vietnamization was an honourable 
strategy of the Nixon administration’s policies; in opposition to the orthodox historiography. 
The evidence that had been used showed that reduced American involvement in the Vietnam 
War would be beneficial to both the U.S. and the South Vietnamese.  The U.S. would benefit 
from troop withdrawals, lower casualty rates and lower military spending; this would help to 
cool American domestic opposition. Furthermore, troop withdrawals showed Americans and 
a larger international audience that America was willing to wind down the war and thus the 
burden of bringing an end to the Vietnam War would be transferred to the North Vietnamese. 
Nixon argued ‘the phased shifting of defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese would 
give them the time and means to adjust. It would assure the American people that our own 
involvement was not open-ended. It would preserve our credibility abroad and our cohesion 
at home.’133 Additionally, the alternatives to Vietnamization were either drastic escalation or 
unilateral withdrawal and so to ‘Vietnamize’ the war seemed the most honourable option. 
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Therefore, Jussi Hanihimaki’s argument that ‘Vietnamization did little to achieve peace with 
honour’134 does not appear to recognise the benefits of this strategy for the South Vietnamese. 
The second part of this chapter highlighted some of the successes of Vietnamization and 
Pacification which identified how the strategy increased military and political defence and 
confidence among the South Vietnamese; it was hoped that this would convince the North 
Vietnamese to proceed with negotiations. The example of the Lam Son 719 Operation was 
used to support this argument as the ARVN took on a greater role in military operations and 
were mostly successful in their attempts. Therefore, it was anticipated that the North 
Vietnamese would realise that the South had increased strength and confidence and would 
not need to rely on the U.S. The second part of the chapter corresponds with the revisionist 
argument that there were visible South Vietnamese gains following Vietnamization, as 
George Herring argued: ‘Vietnamization was in full swing by early 1970, and most observers 
agreed that significant gains had been made.’135 The developed strength of the South 
Vietnamese might have convinced the North that they could defend themselves without 
American support. Therefore, the evidence suggested that Vietnamization was an honourable 
way to convince the North Vietnamese to negotiate and ultimately bring an end to the war. 
The third part of this chapter argued that it would be unfair to criticise the Nixon 
administration for separating the political and military issues in the Vietnam War; this is 
because the Americans believed that the South Vietnamese should decide their own political 
future without the interference of any outsider countries. This chapter also opposes the post-
revisionist argument, as Gabriel Kolko argued that ‘peace with honor’ was unlikely.136 On the 
contrary, Vietnamization was honourably intended to increase the confidence and defence of 
the South Vietnamese; evidence suggests that the information given to the Nixon 
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administration advised that the South Vietnamese were gaining significant strength and so 
U.S. troop withdrawals continued.  
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Chapter Three: Operation Linebacker II, December 18-29, 1972 
On December 18th 1972, the United States began heavy bombing with the use of B-
52s over North Vietnam. Officially known as Operation Linebacker II, the bombings lasted 
for twelve days in total over the festive period and thus became known as the ‘Christmas 
bombings.’137 The bombings were initiated as a result of continuous intransigence from the 
North and South Vietnamese in peace negotiations. In Henry Kissinger’s memoirs, he 
carefully explained how the North Vietnamese had forced them into returning to military 
operations to bring about an end to the war and more specifically to negotiations. Kissinger 
argued that ‘Hanoi had in effect made a strategic decision to prolong the war, abort all 
negotiations, and at the last moment seek unconditional victory.’138 
This chapter will argue that the Christmas Bombings represented the only viable 
solution for the Nixon administration to reach a peace agreement with the North Vietnamese. 
An argument will be made against the claim from some historians, such as Gabriel Kolko, 
that the Nixon administration was simply seeking a ‘decent interval’ between American 
withdrawal and the end of the war to protect their international credibility.139 Undoubtedly 
the American bombing campaign over North Vietnam once again attracted the attention of 
the American public as it appeared that Nixon had broken his promise of Vietnamizing the 
war by escalating military operations. However, this chapter will argue that from evidence 
gathered by the Americans and the ongoing intransigence of both Vietnamese sides; 
Operation Linebacker II seemed necessary to incite commitment to a serious peace 
agreement. Although there is little argument that the bombing strategy can be considered 
honourable, evidence in this chapter will demonstrate that it was the only way to achieve 
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peace through a negotiated settlement of the war.  With regards to Nixon’s decision to go 
ahead with these bombings, Henry Kissinger argued that ‘Nixon chose the only weapon he 
had available. His decision speeded the end of the war; even in retrospect I can think of no 
other measure that would have.’140 To assess how necessary the Linebacker II Operation was, 
this chapter will assess the targets of the operation, the intended incentives for Hanoi, the 
incentives for President Thieu, the return of American Prisoners of War and the agreement to 
return to the negotiating table. 
Among orthodox historiography American bombing in Vietnam was widely 
condemned. Historians such as Jussi Hanhimaki have argued that ‘bombing campaign that 
had no obvious military objective… the bombings focused heavily on the key areas near 
Hanoi and Haiphong inflicting heavy “collateral” (i.e. civilian) damage.’141 Furthermore, 
Hanhimaki argued that the bombing had limited influence over the North Vietnamese; he 
stated ‘the impact of the Christmas Bombings on the morale of the North was minimal.’142 
One of the major arguments prevalent among historians was that the Nixon administration 
‘was not searching for peace with honour but an exit strategy and a decent interval before 
South Vietnam’s political future was determined.’143 However, revisionist historians such as 
Guenter Lewy have argued that bombing campaigns and more specifically ‘Linebacker II 
helped bring about a cease-fire, but it failed to achieve a settlement that could be considered a 
victory for either South Vietnam or the U.S.’144 
Post-revisionists tend to be fairly critical of Nixon’s foreign policy toward Vietnam 
but recognise the limited options that the Nixon administration had remaining. Gabriel Kolko 
argued that ‘all that the Christmas bombing did was isolate the administration politically and 
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put it on the defensive.’145  In contrast to orthodox historians, Kolko claimed that there was 
‘no evidence whatsoever for, and a great deal against, the notion that the White House was 
merely interested in a “decent interval” after the Paris Agreement during which the United 
States could respectably extricate itself from Thieu’s case.’146 Similarly, George Herring 
argued that ‘the bombing certainly gave the North Vietnamese reason to resume negotiations, 
especially since they had exhausted their stock of surface-to-air missiles by December 30.’147 
After the collapse of the October 1972 agreement, there had still been no real progress 
with negotiations by December 13th 1972. Therefore, one of the Nixon administration’s 
priorities was to speed up the negotiation process with North and South Vietnam to get a 
peace agreement finalised. By this point Nixon claimed that ‘only the strongest action would 
have any effect in convincing Hanoi that negotiating a fair settlement with us was a better 
option for them than continuing the war.’148 One of the potential problems with the operation, 
which was fully recognised by the Nixon administration, was that severe bombings above the 
20th parallel in Vietnam ‘would be strongly resented by many in the U.S. and especially those 
in the Congress who had long opposed the bombing of North Vietnam.’149 However, a 
continuation of an already drawn out war was also likely to be poorly received. As stated by 
John Negroponte, of the National Security Council, December 14th 1972: ‘Hanoi has no 
intention to meet any of the basic requirements that we made clear to them... and through a 
series of irritating dilatory tactics has pursued a course which can be interpreted as desire to 
achieve either no agreement at all or an agreement substantially worse than that achieved in 
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late October.’150 Furthermore, with the upcoming meeting of the new 93rd United States 
Congress on January 3rd 1973, Kissinger told Alexander Haig that ‘given the complexion of 
the new Congress, we simply will not be able to hold Congressional support. This Congress 
is more liberal than the last.’151 Therefore, as the evidence suggested a continuation of the 
war was not an available opportunity for the U.S. 
One of the main problems for the Nixon administration was to convince Hanoi that a 
continuation of the war would be the worst option; it was hoped the strength of U.S. 
bombings would deter the North from delaying talks and instead move them towards an 
agreement.152 In his memoirs, Kissinger explained that Alexander Haig, ‘favoured B-52 
attacks, especially North of the 20th parallel, on the ground that only a massive shock could 
bring Hanoi back to the conference table... Nixon and Haig were essentially right... there 
were no other options.’153 There were a multitude of reasons for the final decision to go ahead 
with the 1972 Linebacker II operation against Hanoi. Up until 1972 most of the fighting in 
the war occurred in South Vietnam, however it was believed by the Nixon administration that 
the bombing could bring the war to the North quite significantly. Nixon explained in the 
Fourth Annual Report to Congress, 1973: ‘we had to make clear that Hanoi could not 
continue to wage war in the South while its territory was immune, and that we would not 
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tolerate an indefinite delay in the negotiations.’154 It was believed that if the U.S. could 
heavily disrupt the North Vietnamese then they might be more willing to accept agreements 
thus speeding up the process of negotiation.155 
Another reason for the operation was illustrated by Alexander Haig, who explained to 
President Thieu that the bombing was partially ‘designed to again convey to Hanoi that they 
could not trifle with President Nixon. More importantly, however, the action which was now 
underway would underline to Hanoi the determination of the President to enforce the 
provisions of any political settlement that might be arrived at.’156 In essence, Haig was telling 
Thieu that the bombings acted as a warning to the North Vietnamese of the steps that the U.S. 
might take if they were to break any peace agreements that would eventually be made with 
the South. The Nixon administration wanted an agreement as soon as possible however they 
did not want that to effect the substance of the negotiations. Nixon stated to Kissinger in a 
memorandum before the bombings had begun: ‘while we want peace just as soon as we can 
get it, that we want a peace that is honorable and a peace that will last.’157 Nixon hoped that 
the bombings would make the North Vietnamese realise that the U.S. was in no hurry to rush 
negotiations that would not be adequate for South Vietnam, he argued that those ‘two 
considerations—an honorable peace and a lasting peace—are the overriding considerations as 
distinguished from any deadline for rushing into a peace agreement which is not adequately 
nailed down in its details and which could lead to another war in the future.’158 Therefore, 
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bombings would continue dependent upon the response of the North Vietnamese and the 
substance of their negotiations.  
According to the Nixon administration the 1972 Christmas Bombings played a 
significant part in bringing Hanoi back to the negotiating table. In a conversation on January 
4th 1973, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that 
the bombings were vital to American interests. Moorer stated that the U.S. ‘had 731 B–52 
sorties over North Vietnam against 40 targets. We lost about 2%. The North Vietnamese have 
about 900 missiles. They ran out of missiles. I think this pushed their quick reply to us.’159 
The information that was given to the Nixon administration identified that the defensive 
actions of the North Vietnamese dwindled and this may have had an impact on their decision 
to proceed with negotiations. Moorer further explained: ‘the reason they responded to us is 
we saturated their defences. We have many intercepts showing shortages. We could have 
gone on with relative impunity. They use 50 missiles for one aircraft they shoot down—about 
the same rate as the past.’160 The evidence provided to the Nixon administration therefore 
suggests that Operation Linebacker II had significant military objectives, more specifically in 
reducing the military defences of the North Vietnamese. Melvin Laird explained that the 
reduction of Hanoi’s defences ‘had great psychological impact. It was a tremendous 
operation.’161 It is also significant that the Nixon administration remained in contact with the 
North Vietnamese while the bombings occurred in an attempt to make them realise that 
bombing could be concluded upon Hanoi’s request. Nixon explained in his Fourth Annual 
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Report to Congress: ‘during this time we maintained direct private communications with 
Hanoi. Once we had been assured that serious talks could again be undertaken, we suspended 
our bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th parallel on December 31, 1972.’162 The 
significance of this quotation lies in the direct link that Nixon displayed between the bombing 
of North Vietnam and the subsequent negotiations. Therefore, Nixon’s link supports the 
argument that Operation Linebacker II had a direct impact on peace negotiations as bombing 
was ended when North Vietnam agreed to resume negotiations. 
The targeted bombing zones of Operation Linebacker II indicated clear objectives; it 
was hoped that these targets would be beneficial to the South Vietnamese because they 
attacked Hanoi’s communication and supply lines. By weakening the war effort of the North 
Vietnamese, the U.S. hoped that Hanoi would be more inclined to negotiate rather than 
continue the war. As explained to Kissinger by the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie 
Godley, American bombing was the best way to cut off the North because ‘as long as the 
fighting continues in Cambodia and Vietnam the North Vietnamese need the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. The American bombing of the trail makes it more difficult for the North Vietnamese to 
get their supplies and manpower to their destinations in the South.’163 Evidence indicated 
clear targets for the U.S. B-52s; in a conversation between Thomas Moorer and the Deputy 
Commander of the Military in Vietnam, John Vogt, bombing targets that would diminish 
North Vietnamese supplies were outlined: ‘the Hanoi Railroad Station right there down town 
and the marshalling yard which is loaded with railroad cars and full of supplies.’164 Moorer 
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then suggested further targets that would cause more harm to Hanoi’s war effort, such as the 
‘big Transformer Station and Bac Yen Complex which I got a picture from today and it 
(looking at it this morning) is loaded with everything I can think of and it is only 20 miles 
North of Hanoi.’165 These targets were intended to hinder the production and supply lines that 
were utilised by the North Vietnamese army. This operation was therefore further incentive 
for the North to commit to bringing about an end to the War in Vietnam as their fighting 
capabilities were being dwindled by continuous bombings and attacks.  Similarly, during a 
discussion between Nixon and Kissinger for potential targets of the Linebacker II operation, 
Kissinger argued for the need to attack ‘all power plants simultaneously... [And] we are going 
to get the ship yards in Haiphong, we are going to get the marshalling yards, the rail yards, 
Radio Hanoi, we’ll get the transmitters at the outskirts of town.’166  
In a conversation between Kissinger and Nixon, there was discussion about some of 
the results of the bombing strategy and how this impacted the North Vietnamese. In this 
conversation it was stated that bombing had successfully attacked Radio Hanoi and they were 
off the air. Kissinger stated: ‘Radio Hanoi has been off the air for ten hours... And that is 
bound to create havoc up there. [...] Because they rely on that radio, and also it’s the radio on 
which all their guerrillas rely for news and instructions.’167 This conversation can be used as 
evidence to argue that the 1972 December bombings had an impact on the war effort of the 
North Vietnamese as the U.S. had managed to disrupt their communications. The Nixon 
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administration intended to weaken Hanoi to the point that they felt under threat from the U.S; 
as Moorer stated, the administration wanted to ‘isolate Hanoi from the rest of North Vietnam. 
Those targets that… join Hanoi to the remainder of North Vietnam will be attacked… resume 
destroying the northeast line of communications as a first priority with destruction of 
northwest line of communications as second priority. LOC attacks include bombing of RR 
bridges, RR yards, RR shops and highway bridges, and seeding of waterways.’168  
As with most twentieth century wars, bombing campaigns unfortunately caused some 
collateral damage to the surrounding areas. However, the Nixon administration believed that 
the designated targets for Operation Linebacker II would be significant enough to convince 
the North Vietnamese to end their intransigence toward peace agreements. In addition, the 
Nixon administration received a report that Hanoi was evacuating its citizens. In a telephone 
conversation between Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, Kissinger stated that ‘we just got 
a report that they are totally evacuating Hanoi.’169 This indicated that there was less danger of 
injuring and killing civilians in Hanoi but also indicated that bombings must have been 
effective to induce evacuation. Therefore, Nixon claimed that the North Vietnamese ‘think 
we are going to come at them with more stuff all over the city? [...] That can’t [but] be 
affect[ing] their morale of their people to evacuate that city.’170 The effect on North 
Vietnamese morale was also another incentive for the leaders to pursue agreements on ending 
the war. It is difficult to criticise the Nixon administration for causing civilian deaths in 
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Vietnam; the administration had been informed of Hanoi’s evacuation and unfortunately 
civilian deaths were unavoidable due to the guerrilla nature of the warfare from the North and 
U.S. stray bombs. 
Despite the efforts of the Nixon administration, reports from Hanoi made it to the 
American press and it was stated that the Linebacker II operation had damaged the ‘Hanoi 
Hilton’; a camp which held American POWs and was satirically nicknamed after the Hilton 
Hotel by captured soldiers.171 On December 22nd 1972, in The Washington Post, Michael 
Gelter stated: ‘Radio Hanoi claimed that the U.S. bombing on December 21 and 22 had 
damaged the Hilton-Hanoi, which had been turned into a prison holding captured American 
airmen, and injured “a number of residents.”’172 Richard T. Kennedy, of the National 
Security Council Staff, claimed that the North Vietnamese assertion that bombing had 
actually been detrimental to American interests was ‘undoubtedly a propaganda ploy 
although it is claimed that Joan Baez and others examined damaged areas of the compound. 
From the descriptions it seems likely that any damage may have resulted from B–52 shock 
waves.’ 173 Kennedy argued that there was opposing evidence to North Vietnamese claims; he 
claimed that ‘the nearest target was a marshalling yard, some 700 yards away, and this was 
hit by visual means. After resolving some differences of opinion on press handling, DOD is 
making statement that we hit only military targets.’174 The North Vietnamese clearly 
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recognised the impact that such claims would have on the American public, however 
Kennedy also argued that if the Hanoi’s claims were correct then ‘it is the responsibility of 
the North Vietnamese under the Geneva Convention to insure that prisoners are kept away 
from areas of danger.’175 Additionally, later evidence gathered by the Nixon administration 
revealed to them that Hanoi’s claims were false. On January 4th 1973, in conversation with 
the President, Thomas Moorer stated that ‘we have pictures of all the POW camps. They 
were not damaged. We have eye-witness accounts of missiles falling back.’176 Therefore, the 
evidence supports the argument that the Nixon administration were not carelessly bombing 
populated areas of Hanoi in attempt to speed up negotiations but had specific targets that 
were intended to hinder the North Vietnamese war effort. 
Although it is difficult to argue that this part of Nixon’s strategy was honourable, it 
can still be regarded as a way to achieve peace. Furthermore, the Nixon administration argued 
that while they were being criticised for such damage, the North Vietnamese were not. In a 
memorandum from January 4th 1973, Nixon argued that ‘we should get out the details on the 
hospitals, orphanages, and so on, and schools that were destroyed by the enemy... It’s a 
double standard, and hypocritical. American airmen risk their lives and do their damndest to 
avoid civilian targets, and we get these complaints, but not on the other side.’177 Furthermore, 
Kissinger stated that the Americans were accused of ‘indiscriminate carpet bombing of 
heavily populated areas.’ However, Kissinger argued that ‘the targets were airports, 
antiaircraft defences, industrial plants. As it happened, most of these were on the other side of 
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the Red River from Hanoi’s residential areas. There was next to no damage in Hanoi proper 
except that caused by a few stray bombs.’178 
After Henry Kissinger’s news conference on October 26th 1972, which claimed that 
the Nixon administration ‘believe that peace is at hand. We believe that an agreement is 
within sight...’179 the hopes of the American public and Congress were raised. However, the 
intransigence of both North and South Vietnam meant that while the American troops had 
been successfully withdrawn, the Prisoners of War (POWs) remained in North Vietnam and 
with no agreement nearing it seemed less likely that the prisoners would be released. This 
claim is corroborated by Melvin Laird, in a memorandum to the President; he stated ‘the US 
has encouraged the US people and the rest of the world to believe that peace is at hand and 
that our POWs would be home momentarily.’180 However, Laird regarded this as a ‘dilemma’ 
for the Nixon administration and advised the President that ‘we believe that you will no 
longer get the support of Congress for continuation of the war if our POWs are not returned 
to the US promptly.’181 Laird’s advice provided evidence for the argument there was a 
political purpose to Operation Linebacker II; for example, if the U.S. did not attempt to 
quicken an agreement on the end of the war, they would lose Congressional support for 
aiding the South Vietnamese in negotiations. With the new 93rd Congressional taking office 
on January 3rd 1973, Nixon was very aware of the pressure to get an agreement reached 
before the new Congress cut funding.182 Therefore, as Kissinger predicted ‘if the negotiations 
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break down tomorrow we will have to resume massive bombing and take the position that our 
only objectives henceforth will be U.S. military disengagement in return for the release of our 
prisoners.’183 
The available evidence for Operation Linebacker II suggested that the return of the 
American POWs was one of many incentives to bomb north of the 20th parallel. Furthermore, 
the evidence indicated that the Nixon administration believed bombings had the potential to 
draw North Vietnam back to negotiations and an agreement on the return of POWs could 
finally be reached. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, stated that the bombing campaign 
showed ‘a significant military effect, then people can draw their own conclusions on why 
they [North Vietnam] returned to the table. We did our bombing carefully; that caused some 
losses.’184 Rogers further indicated that criticisms over the bombings were unwarranted 
because ‘we merely returned to our previous policy when they backed away from the 
agreement’ 185 and therefore the Nixon administration needed to ‘show the proof that we 
didn’t bomb our own POWs and other instances to show all the false statements being 
made.’186 Therefore, it would seem inaccurate to argue that the Linebacker II Operation was 
counterproductive to American interests, which was argued by Hanhimaki, as the Nixon 
administration acquired evidence to prove that bombings did not harm their own soldiers and 
were not detrimental to U.S. interests. 
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The 1972 Christmas Bombings were partially used as a tool to persuade the North 
Vietnamese to continue negotiations. However, there is evidence to suggest that the bombing 
strategy was also intended for Nguyen Van Thieu, the leader of South Vietnam, who had 
become intransigent with peace agreements too. In a message from Henry Kissinger to 
Alexander Haig, it was made clear that there was a need for the Nixon administration to 
influence the decisions of both North and South Vietnam. Kissinger stated that we ‘find 
ourselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position. We have no leverage on Hanoi or 
Saigon, and we are becoming prisoners of both sides’ internecine conflicts. Our task clearly is 
to get some leverage on both of them.’ 187 Thieu’s intransigence would become problematic 
for the Nixon administration if it was not immediately amended, as argued by Kissinger in his 
memoirs: ‘Saigon, for its part, would see no point in flexibility; with Congress undoubtedly 
pressing cutoffs of funds it would run no additional risks by sticking to its course.’188 
Therefore, Kissinger advised that ‘we should reseed the mines, as heavily as possible 
including of course north of the 20th parallel... We should take off all restrictions on bombing 
south of the 20th parallel and step up our attacks, particularly by B–52s...We should resume 
reconnaissance activities north of the 20th parallel immediately which would serve as a 
warning to Hanoi.’189 This evidence indicated a further motive for Operation Linebacker II to 
convince both the North and South Vietnam to participate in serious negotiations by 
increasing leverage over both regions or face the potential termination of American support. 
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For the Nixon administration, however, it was more than just leverage that was 
needed over the South Vietnamese; the U.S. also needed to preserve Saigon’s support. In 
Nixon’s Fourth Foreign Policy Report to Congress from May 3rd 1973, he stated that the 
administration ‘talked sternly with our friends in South Vietnam. In our view they were 
holding out for terms that were impossible to achieve without several more years of warfare--
if then.’190 The problem for Nixon was that during December 1972, there were already talks 
of cutting aid to the war from Congress. In a letter to the South Vietnamese, Nixon stated that 
members of the 93rd Congress have made clear that ‘if Saigon is the only roadblock for 
reaching agreement on this basis they will personally lead the fight when the new Congress 
reconvenes on January 3 to cut off all military and economic assistance to Saigon.’191 Henry 
Kissinger’s final cable to Paris, from December 11th 1972, stated that ‘pressures on Saigon 
would be essential so that Thieu does not think he has faced us down, and we can 
demonstrate  that we will not put up with our ally’s intransigence any more than we will do 
so with our enemy.’192 Therefore, the Nixon administration needed to show that they would 
not accept the current South Vietnamese stance but at the same time encourage them that they 
had continued American support. One way of retaining Thieu’s support would be to bomb 
north of the 20th parallel and take the Vietnam War to Hanoi. 
In a conversation between South Vietnamese Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 
Alexander Haig, Thieu and South Vietnamese Press Secretary, Hoang Duc Nha, the Nixon 
administration argued that ‘President Thieu cannot rationally deprive President Nixon of the 
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platform he must have to continue to support President Thieu.’193 Haig further argued that 
‘the outcome would be inevitable and prompt a total cut off of U.S. support. This is not the 
desire of President Nixon and is not presented to President Thieu as a threat but merely a 
recitation of simple objective reality.’194 Therefore, Operation Linebacker II presented further 
incentive for Thieu to proceed with negotiations as the alternative would have been to 
continue the war; this would not have been accepted by Nixon or Congress and American aid 
would be withdrawn. According to Nixon’s Diary this show of support and constant line of 
communication with Thieu was successful. Nixon stated ‘the South Vietnamese seem to be 
coming more into line’195 and that Thieu was stating that he was going to get ‘a commitment 
from the United States to continue to protect South Vietnam in the event such an agreement is 
broken.’196 
In his memoirs, Richard Nixon wrote about how the Linebacker II Operation was no 
easy decision to make but that it was a useful tool to speed up negotiations. Nixon stated: ‘the 
order to renew bombing the week before Christmas was the most difficult decision I made 
during the entire war; at the same time, however it was also one of the most clear-cut and 
necessary ones.’197 Furthermore, Nixon defended the operation by stating that bombing 
would continue dependent upon the response of the North Vietnamese: ‘we offered to stop 
the bombing above the 20th parallel once the arrangements for the meeting had been 
completed and had been publicly announced.’198 In essence, the bombings would end when 
the negotiated agreements restarted and this was left up to the North Vietnamese to decide.  
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Evidence from the Nixon administration suggested that the President was honest to 
his claim that bombing would stop as soon as a meeting was agreed to. Nixon’s 
administration told the North Vietnamese that ‘if the DRV agrees to this meeting, the U.S., as 
a sign of its good will, will again suspend its bombing north of the 20th parallel starting as of 
midnight December 31 and lasting for the duration of the negotiating sessions.’199 
Additionally, further incentive was stated to make sure that the North Vietnamese did not 
once against resort to dilatory tactics: ‘if an agreement is reached, this restriction will 
continue. The U.S. side reaffirms that it will stop all bombing and shelling against the 
territory of Democratic Republic of Vietnam within 48 hours of an agreement in Paris.’200 
Eventually, as Nixon stated ‘on December 28 the North Vietnamese gave in and confirmed 
the January 2 and January 8 dates… at 7pm Washington time on December 29 bombing 
above the 20th parallel was suspended.’201 The evidence therefore suggests that the bombings 
helped to achieve a peace agreement in Vietnam, albeit in a non-peaceful way.  
There was no doubt in Nixon’s mind regarding the outcome of Operation Linebacker 
II, in his memoirs he argued that ‘the bombing had done its job; it had been successful, and 
now it could be ended. It was good news for us all.’202 Therefore, Nixon suggested that 
Operation Linebacker II certainly played a significant part in speeding up negotiations; 
however it is also important to recognise the continued diplomatic line between the U.S. and 
the North and South Vietnamese. In Henry Kissinger’s memoirs, he argued that the 
combination of both diplomatic and military efforts eventually led to the peace agreement 
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being reached. Kissinger stated that diplomatic negotiations played a vital part in bringing the 
Vietnam War to an end, however he argued that diplomacy was not the only factor; he 
believed that military tactics such as Operation Linebacker II also played a significant part in 
ending the war.203 With regard to the historiographical debate, the argument of this chapter 
positions itself between the arguments made by revisionist and post-revisionist historians. 
While orthodox historians have argued that Operation Linebacker II was unnecessary, the 
combination of diplomacy and military pressure certainly had an impact on the North 
Vietnamese and made them eventually proceed with negotiations.204 Revisionist, Guenter 
Lewy argued that Operation Linebacker II helped to bring a cease-fire to Vietnam but also 
argued that there was an element of the Nixon administration seeking a decent interval from 
the war.205 This chapter has argued that the bombing strategy certainly did help to encourage 
both North and South Vietnam to proceed with negotiations, and there is no evidence to 
suggest a decent interval was sought. Operation Linebacker II was not the most honourable 
way to attain a peace agreement between the North and South Vietnamese. However, by 1972 
with increasing intransigence from both Vietnamese regions, the Americans had few options 
to conclude the war. The other alternative of a continuation of the war had the potential to 
cause many more casualties for both the Americans and Vietnamese. Therefore, evidence 
supports the argument that Linebacker II was most valuable to the Nixon administration 
when combined with diplomatic lines of communication with both Vietnamese sides. 
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Conclusion 
To assess the impact of Nixon’s ‘peace with honor’ this dissertation has considered 
the policy of linkage, the strategy of Vietnamization and Operation Linebacker II. The Nixon 
administration attempted to influence the North and South Vietnamese into reaching a peace 
agreement that would end the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, a solution to a conflict that had 
carried on for over a generation was never going to be easily attainable. Similarly, the issues 
between North and South Vietnam were never going to be straightforwardly solved. In terms 
of casualties and costs the war was expensive for all that were involved; the Nixon 
administration wanted to achieve an honourable peace as soon as possible, but not one that 
would destroy all their previous efforts. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to 
identify the impact of ‘peace with honor’ on the Nixon administration’s foreign policy 
decisions.  
Chapter one assessed Nixon’s policy of linkage, this policy encouraged peace within 
international relations. It was anticipated by the Nixon administration that linkage would help 
to spur on peace negotiations with the Vietnamese. This chapter has argued that linkage was 
an honourable way for the Nixon administration to achieve peace for Vietnam; the policy 
promoted the cooperation of ideologically opposed countries and détente. This was 
particularly honourable as it marked a change in attitudes toward Communist countries. 
There is evidence to suggest that the advice given by the Soviet Union and China might have 
had an influence in the North Vietnamese decision to proceed with negotiations. However, 
linkage was not primarily intended to bring an end to the Vietnam War and therefore its 
influence on negotiations should not be overstated. 
The Vietnamization strategy discussed in chapter two encouraged peace through 
strengthening the defence of the South Vietnamese. The Nixon administration hoped that the 
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increased strength of the South would convince the North that negotiations were the best 
option for them; the strength of the South was intended to replace the presence of U.S. troops. 
The strategy can be regarded as honourable as it encouraged the South Vietnamese to 
consolidate themselves as an independent country so that in future they would not need 
support from other countries for defence. There is evidence to support the argument that 
Vietnamization was successful for example; the Lam Son 719 operation was fought solely by 
South Vietnamese troops. Of course, Vietnamization alone would not have influenced the 
North Vietnamese decision outright. However, a combination of policies were likely to have 
a bigger influence over Hanoi. 
Chapter three assessed Operation Linebacker II, the military operation to use B-52s 
over Hanoi in an attempt to get the North Vietnamese to proceed with serious negotiations 
and to show the South Vietnamese that they still had the support of the Nixon administration. 
Although a bombing campaign cannot be considered honourable, this military strategy was 
one of the few options that the Nixon administration had remaining. Evidence from the Nixon 
administration directly linked the Christmas Bombings to the resumption of negotiations with 
the North Vietnamese. Therefore, while the strategy may not have been particularly 
honourable; it certainly did have an influence on fast tracking peace negotiations in Vietnam 
by putting an end to the intransigence of both the North and South Vietnamese. 
This dissertation does not position itself neatly between the pre-existing 
historiographical debates. The orthodox view of David Halberstam suggested that the Nixon 
administration was trying to achieve a victory in Vietnam.206 However, this dissertation has 
shown that the Nixon administration was transferring the burden of the war to the South 
Vietnam which would not suggest a U.S. victory was hoped for. Another orthodox view from 
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Jussi Hanhimaki argued that the U.S. did not achieve any real peace with honour.207 
However, this dissertation has argued that linkage and Vietnamization were honourable ways 
to encourage a peace agreement and Operation Linebacker II ended the intransigence of the 
North Vietnamese and soon after led to a peace agreement. Revisionist, Michael Lind 
recognised the importance of military operations in bringing about a peace agreement, 
however he also argued that it was necessary to preserve American credibility.208 In contrast, 
post-revisionist Gabriel Kolko argued that a military solution would have a limited impact 
and that diplomacy was the last available solution for the Nixon administration.209 The 
argument of this dissertation corresponds with the revisionist argument that Operation 
Linebacker II was significant in reaching a peace agreement, however there is evidence to 
suggest that it was a combination of both diplomatic and military tactics that made had the 
most impact on spurring on negotiations. This argument supports a statement made by Henry 
Kissinger; he argued: ‘it was diplomacy, after all, tedious years of it that had produced the 
very agreement… But it had not been diplomacy in a vacuum. Military pressure had been an 
important component.’210  Linkage improved diplomatic international relations, 
Vietnamization increased the strength of the South Vietnamese so that American troops could 
be withdrawn and Operation Linebacker II forced the North Vietnamese back to the 
negotiating table. Therefore, this dissertation has argued that the combination of diplomatic 
negotiations and the bombing campaign were the best way for the Nixon administration to 
achieve ‘peace with honor’ for America and Vietnam. This dissertation does not intend to 
suggest that linkage, Vietnamization and Operation Linebacker II were decisive factors in 
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influencing the North Vietnamese decision to proceed with negotiations. However, as a 
combination they were likely to have had an impact on Hanoi. 
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